Abstract
China introduced employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) in 1992 purely as an employee incentive scheme. The government initiated the policy experiment on ESOPs as part of China's reform of its state-owned enterprises, and it was abruptly terminated 2. years after initiation. This policy experiment resulted in an exogenous sample of ESOPs that allows us to provide the first evidence from Chinese firms on the performance-ESOP relation. After examining a variety of performance measures, including ROA, ROE, Tobin's q, and productivity, we find little difference in performance between ESOP firms and non-ESOP firms.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1541-1551 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | Journal of Banking and Finance |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue number | 6 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jun 2011 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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Meng, R., Ning, X., Zhou, X., & Zhu, H. (2011). Do ESOPs enhance firm performance? Evidence from China's reform experiment. Journal of Banking and Finance, 35(6), 1541-1551. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.11.004
Meng, Rujing ; Ning, Xiangdong ; Zhou, Xianming et al. / Do ESOPs enhance firm performance? Evidence from China's reform experiment. In: Journal of Banking and Finance. 2011 ; Vol. 35, No. 6. pp. 1541-1551.
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title = "Do ESOPs enhance firm performance? Evidence from China's reform experiment",
abstract = "China introduced employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) in 1992 purely as an employee incentive scheme. The government initiated the policy experiment on ESOPs as part of China's reform of its state-owned enterprises, and it was abruptly terminated 2. years after initiation. This policy experiment resulted in an exogenous sample of ESOPs that allows us to provide the first evidence from Chinese firms on the performance-ESOP relation. After examining a variety of performance measures, including ROA, ROE, Tobin's q, and productivity, we find little difference in performance between ESOP firms and non-ESOP firms.",
keywords = "Employee ownership, Firm performance, Incentives",
author = "Rujing Meng and Xiangdong Ning and Xianming Zhou and Hongquan Zhu",
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language = "English",
volume = "35",
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Meng, R, Ning, X, Zhou, X & Zhu, H 2011, 'Do ESOPs enhance firm performance? Evidence from China's reform experiment', Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 35, no. 6, pp. 1541-1551. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.11.004
Do ESOPs enhance firm performance? Evidence from China's reform experiment. / Meng, Rujing; Ning, Xiangdong; Zhou, Xianming et al.
In: Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 35, No. 6, 06.2011, p. 1541-1551.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - Do ESOPs enhance firm performance? Evidence from China's reform experiment
AU - Meng, Rujing
AU - Ning, Xiangdong
AU - Zhou, Xianming
AU - Zhu, Hongquan
PY - 2011/6
Y1 - 2011/6
N2 - China introduced employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) in 1992 purely as an employee incentive scheme. The government initiated the policy experiment on ESOPs as part of China's reform of its state-owned enterprises, and it was abruptly terminated 2. years after initiation. This policy experiment resulted in an exogenous sample of ESOPs that allows us to provide the first evidence from Chinese firms on the performance-ESOP relation. After examining a variety of performance measures, including ROA, ROE, Tobin's q, and productivity, we find little difference in performance between ESOP firms and non-ESOP firms.
AB - China introduced employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) in 1992 purely as an employee incentive scheme. The government initiated the policy experiment on ESOPs as part of China's reform of its state-owned enterprises, and it was abruptly terminated 2. years after initiation. This policy experiment resulted in an exogenous sample of ESOPs that allows us to provide the first evidence from Chinese firms on the performance-ESOP relation. After examining a variety of performance measures, including ROA, ROE, Tobin's q, and productivity, we find little difference in performance between ESOP firms and non-ESOP firms.
KW - Employee ownership
KW - Firm performance
KW - Incentives
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.11.004
DO - 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.11.004
M3 - Article
SN - 0378-4266
VL - 35
SP - 1541
EP - 1551
JO - Journal of Banking and Finance
JF - Journal of Banking and Finance
IS - 6
ER -
Meng R, Ning X, Zhou X, Zhu H. Do ESOPs enhance firm performance? Evidence from China's reform experiment. Journal of Banking and Finance. 2011 Jun;35(6):1541-1551. doi: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.11.004
